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Executive Summary
This document reports on a workshop titled ‘Confidence & 
Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)’ 
held in Geneva on 3 August 2014, and jointly organized by 
King’s College London and the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy.
The workshop focused on three key aspects of confidence 
and compliance with the BWC: 
• To what extent is the BWC verifiable?
• Do the CBMs build confidence?
• What would a legally-binding mechanism look like 
today?
The workshop provided a unique forum for cross-Group state 
party representatives, civil society experts, UN agencies and 
other BWC stakeholders to interact in an environment that 
facilitated a fruitful debate on these questions. The debate was 
stimulated through a mix of expert presentations, plenary 
discussion and dialogue in smaller break-out groups.
Verifiability
Presentations at the workshop provided empirically rich detail 
about biological verification processes both in routine on-site 
inspections and in investigations of alleged BWC violations. 
The resounding response to whether the BWC is verifiable 
was “yes”. It is possible for skilled inspectors to distinguish 
legitimate from cheating facilities while not compromising 
proprietary information; it is also possible to uncover a 
bioweapons programme even in situations where elaborate 
concealment strategies are deployed. 
Confidence 
Approaching the question of whether CBMs build confidence 
from a new angle, the workshop explored the larger question 
of what ‘confidence’ in the BWC means for different people 
and states. 
Some of the practices and conditions that inhibit confidence in 
the CBMs were presented to encourage further thinking about 
confidence in the BWC context. These resonated with many of 
the workshop participants, and included: limited inquiry into 
and public testing of CBMs’ content and purposes; lack of a 
mechanism for testing the veracity or completeness of CBM 
reports; CBMs limited accessibility; perception of low utility; 
and accusations of ‘doing politics’ directed at those who raise 
criticisms. 
The response to the question “Do the CBMs build 
confidence?” that emerged from the workshop was “yes, the 
CBMs do build confidence and they are an important aspect 
of building confidence in the BWC, but CBMs should not be 
equated with confidence.” In short, confidence-building goes 
beyond the CBMs.
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A legally-binding mechanism 
Different views on what a legally-binding mechanism would 
look like today were expressed at the workshop. A number of 
participants argued for a multilaterally negotiated, legally-
binding and verifiable provision that would implement all 
articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive 
manner. Some were more specific, arguing for an 
implementing agency – the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Biological Weapons (OPBW) – responsible for investigating 
allegations of bioweapons use and suspicious disease 
outbreaks, assisting and protecting against bioweapons, 
promoting international cooperation, confidence building 
measure, national implementation and monitoring 
developments in science and technology. The OPBW would 
be supported by a professional Technical Secretariat and 
policy-making organs (Executive Council and Conference).
Others highlighted the different political, security and technical 
contexts of today arguing that old concept won’t work. New 
thinking is required, and two principal purposes for a legally 
binding mechanism were put forward: to analyse 
implementation and to coordinate cooperation and assistance. 
Structurally, it was argued for a small organisation focused on 
‘declaration management’ (which could include inspections), 
cooperation and assistance, an executive mechanism (of 
rotating, elected members but not a ‘council’), an 
intersessional process with decision-making power, and 
Review Conferences that move away from an Article-by-Article 
review and instead take on a stronger role of the highest 
decision-making body.
Finding a middle ground, some acknowledged that there are 
imperfections in the BWC but that it is still workable. They 
argued not to amend or add to the Convention itself, but 
rather to strengthen it incrementally through extended 
understandings, agreed procedures and politically-binding 
commitments, all accumulated through successive Review 
Conference and recorded in their Final Documents.
Airing these differences in views and entering into dialogue 
about them well in advance of the upcoming Review 
Conference in 2016 was in large part the aim of the workshop. 
The positive feedback received on the workshop suggests a 
significant step was taken in that direction.
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Introduction
This document reports on a workshop titled ‘Confidence & 
Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention’ held in 
Geneva on 3 August 2014, and jointly organized by King’s 
College London and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
The aim of the workshop was to bring together some of the 
central actors shaping the debate on these key substantive 
issues to exchange views in preparation for the upcoming 
2016 Review Conference.
The workshop was organised around three sessions that 
focus on different aspects of confidence and compliance, 
each introduced by a set of presentations:
Session 1: To what extent is the BWC 
verifiable?
Session 2: Do the CBMs build confidence?
Session 3: What would a legally-binding 
mechanism look like today?
The first part of this report summarises the presentations 
made and the discussions that occurred; the second part of 
the document analyses the key themes emerging from the 
discussions.
The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule in order 
to facilitate open and productive discussion:
When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham 
House Rule, participants are free to use the information 
received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the 
speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.
The speakers at the workshop have given their consent for 
their names to be used in the summary of their presentations 
and related citations. 
The Twitter hashtag #BWCMX was used for the workshop and 
for the subsequent Meeting of Experts. You can view 
comments made by participants and others there, and we 
encourage readers to use this hashtag to post further 
comments about this report.
The workshop was part of a project funded by the United 
Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office titled ‘Beyond 
‘Hard Law’: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention 
through the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) Regime’. 
More details about the project are available at 
w w w. f i l i p p a l e n t z o s . c o m   including a short 
background document entitled ‘The BWC: Compliance, 
Transparency & Confidence’ published in Disarmament Times, 
the quarterly publication of the Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and 
Security on the work happening in and around the United 
Nations, its Member States, and non-governmental 
organizations.
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Summary of Discussions
Session 1 Introduction 
The first session of the workshop tackled one of the most 
deep-seated and fundamental questions faced by the treaty: 
To what extent is the BWC verifiable? 
Unusually for an arms control treaty, the 1972 BWC was 
agreed without on-site verification mechanisms to deter or to 
safeguard against treaty violations. Some states maintain that 
the nature of biological weapons is such that they are 
inherently impossible to verify; not only can significant 
quantities of biological agents be produced in small and readily 
concealable facilities, but most of the equipment required (e.g.  
fermenters, centrifuges, freeze-dryers) is ubiquitous in public, 
private and commercial laboratories. Others argue that while 
the same level of accuracy and reliability as the verification of, 
for example, nuclear arms control treaties is unattainable, it is 
possible to build a satisfactory level of confidence that biology 
is only used for peaceful purposes. They use the term 
‘verification’ as the description of a set of activities – 
declarations, visits and investigations – without making a value 
judgement about the level of assurance of compliance that 
could be achieved by this set of activities.
Clearly, a fully effective verification system for the BWC is 
exceptionally difficult. The multiyear negotiations to create a 
legally binding verification protocol for the BWC broke down in 
2001 after the US government pronounced the draft 
procedures inadequate to detect cheaters yet likely to 
compromise trade secrets and national security. The US has 
repeatedly stated that the BWC is “unverifiable,” most recently 
at the 2011 Review Conference when Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton said that it was “not possible” to fashion a 
verification regime that could enhance confidence that states 
were in compliance with the BWC.
In this session, Amy Smithson, a long-standing authority on 
biological weapons and the BWC who specialises in in-depth 
field research, presented two of her research projects on BWC 
verification. The first presentation provided detailed counter-
intuitive data on how the US biopharmaceutical industry views 
the potential to monitor the BWC. The second presentation 
detailed the experiences of bioweapons verification by the 
UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq.  
Amy Smithson – “Ground truth” from industry 
experts
In the first project described by Smithson, she had solicited 
the views of industry scientists with extensive experience in 
research, development, and production in large, multinational 
companies and smaller pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. She first asked them to visualise the facilities they 
had worked in and to articulate what inspectors would need to 
do to catch illicit weapons activity at those sites. After they 
had assembled their inspection methodology, she had asked 
the industry scientists to describe concerns they would have if 
their inspection strategy, tactics and tools were applied at their 
Lentzos - King’s College London
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respective facilities. The group identified concerns and then 
agreed on ways to address those concerns while still 
satisfying the need of the inspectors to ascertain BWC 
compliance.  In addition, Smithson asked the industry 
scientists to rate how effective their inspection methodology 
would be in practice and to compare how intrusive their 
inspection methodology was in comparison to the inspections 
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The group of biopharmaceutical industry insiders crafted a 
detailed monitoring strategy. To begin with, the industry 
experts recommended that the inspectors rely primarily on 
open source data, which is likely to be more plentiful, 
nuanced, and current than a country’s declaration. Legitimate 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies make 
considerable information available about their current and 
upcoming products, capabilities, and business objectives and 
practices to attract customers, investors and media attention 
to increase sales. Once on site, the industry experts’ 
inspection methodology centers on evaluating whether the 
information the inspectors collect is inconsistent with the 
facility’s stated purpose.
After an overview briefing of the facility to be inspected, the 
industry scientists proposed an extensive facility tour, with the 
host facility giving the inspectors critical documents, such as 
site maps and a piping-and-instrumentation diagram, that 
would allow them to zero in on unusual features or alterations 
that merited an explanation, as well as any efforts by host 
officials to steer the inspectors away from important areas. 
The inspectors should have access to laboratories, the 
production floor, the product purification area, supply 
storerooms, the medical facility, the waste treatment area, and 
the animal facility, without compromising test protocols there. 
The industry experts recommended the standard inspection 
tools, namely observation, document reviews, and interviews. 
They were reticent to allow inspectors to photograph or video 
the inspection, instead proposing the “work-around” of 
providing additional information to address the inspectors’ 
inquiries. Of note, the industry experts proposed taking in-
process samples if inspectors found indications of non-
compliance. Samples would be stored in an onsite lock-box 
as host officials worked with the inspectors to resolve the 
compliance concerns. If those concerns persisted, the 
samples would be analyzed on site using a validated assay or 
in a certified third-party laboratory. Furthermore, the industry 
experts backed the notion of a challenge inspection on the 
heels of a routine inspection that unearthed compliance 
concerns that could not be resolved. Importantly, the industry 
experts’ BWC monitoring proposal could not be more contrary 
to the position of the PhRMA, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, which contends that just allowing 
inspectors on site would jeopardize trade secrets.
Next, the industry scientists argued that skilled inspectors 
employing their monitoring strategy, tactics and tools would be 
able to distinguish legitimate from cheating facilities while not 
compromising proprietary information. The industry experts 
believed the inspectors would really be able to get to the 
bottom of any possible inconsistencies with a facility’s stated 
purpose in certain physical areas of the facility, such as the 
waste treatment area, and by poring over documents. 
Substituting a fake set of documents to mask illicit military 
activity, the industry experts said, would be a monumental 
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Figure 1: US biopharmaceutical industry insiders’ proposed inspection tools.
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Figure 2: US biopharmaceutical industry insiders’ expected level of effectiveness of tools used in combination.
Lentzos - King’s College London
Confidence & Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention 11
Figure 3: US biopharmaceutical industry insiders’ proposed inspection protocol versus the draft BWC protocol.
task. As the slide in Figure 2 shows, the industry experts gave 
a majority of high inspection effectiveness ratings. Clearly, the 
industry experts believed that their verification proposal would 
work in practice. And, as it turned out, the UNSCOM 
inspectors proved the industry experts right. Much of what the 
industry experts proposed for monitoring the BWC bears a 
close resemblance to what UNSCOM inspectors did 
successfully when they unveiled the bioweapons programme 
that Iraq spared no effort to hide from them.
When the industry experts assembled a trial inspection plan to 
test their proposal, they compared the intrusiveness of their 
BWC verification proposal to that of the inspections that the 
FDA conducts. The industry scientists identified 16 similarities 
between these two inspection types, seven differences that 
they believed were unlikely to have any impact on the 
inspected facility, and another seven differences where their 
proposed BWC inspection practices would be less demanding 
than FDA inspections. Of note, the industry experts pegged 
just two differences where their proposed practices may be 
more demanding than FDA inspections. First, their BWC 
inspection team would be on site about five days. FDA teams 
often do not stay that long, but the industry group pointed out 
that the FDA sometimes shows up with no notice and stays as 
long as it deems necessary. Second, the FDA usually sends 
two or three inspectors. The industry experts believed that 
sites could accommodate the larger BWC inspection team 
that they propose, but the accompanying 
group of U.S. government escorts, who 
would also require a host facility escort for 
the duration of the inspection, might 
stress available manpower.
The industry experts drafted and 
assessed their inspection protocol before 
Smithson showed the group the details of 
the BWC protocol as it stood in 2001. 
One of the experts, Dr. George Pierce, summed up their 
reaction to the draft protocol as follows: “’D’ is a good grade 
because that’s really the worst grade you can get. Sometimes 
an ‘F’ shows a little innovation.” Smithson concluded the 
presentation by highlighting that the U.S. biopharmaceutical 
industry insiders she spoke argued for much more stringent 
inspection procedures than those contained in the draft BWC 
protocol.
Key lessons from the project were 1) that governments can be 
more protective of industry than industry would be of itself, 
and 2) you need to ask the “right” people into the process – 
the scientists and facility line managers, not the ‘suits’.
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“The US biopharmaceutical industry 
insiders argued for much more stringent 
inspection procedures than those 
contained in the draft BWC protocol.”
Amy Smithson – Counsel from UNSCOM 
inspectors
Smithson noted that while the industry experts’ views remain 
in untested proposal form, the UN Special Commission on Iraq 
(UNSCOM) provides a treasure trove of biological field 
inspection experience. 
The ceasefire conditions of the 1991 Gulf War gave UNSCOM 
the role of overseeing Iraq’s disarmament, pitting the 
inspectors against a country determined to retain its weapons 
of mass destruction and long-range missiles. When 
UNSCOM’s biological inspectors landed in Baghdad, Iraq had 
already established a strategy to conceal the bioweapons 
programme, complete with tactics such as their requirement 
to be able to move sensitive materials or documents on fifteen 
minutes notice. Iraq’s bioweaponeers were also put on notice 
that they would be killed if they revealed anything to the 
inspectors. Next, this small group of inspectors knew full well 
that conventional wisdom held that inspections could not 
uncover a covert bioweapons programme. Iraq’s first 
biological declaration to UNSCOM was null: Iraq claimed to 
have no biological facilities.
The final factor working against the UNSCOM inspectors was 
sketchy intelligence. The “signatures” of biological weapons 
programmes are far less discernible than nuclear or chemical 
weapons programmes. Even the telltale signs that do exist, 
such as the presence of high-level biosafety containment, are 
not always reliable. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, U.S intelligence 
did not identify Iraq’s main bioweapons production facility, Al 
Hakam, even though this site had a layout very similar to Iraq’s 
chemical weapons production site, Al Muthanna. In the late 
1980s, Iraq powered up its germ weapons program with huge 
purchases of growth media, the nutrients needed for a 
biological seed culture to replicate itself. Before that, under the 
guise of legitimate research Iraqi scientists ordered the seed 
cultures for anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents from 
culture collections in the United States and France. U.S. 
intelligence apparently did not notice these activities, but in the 
mid-1990s Israeli intelligence told UNSCOM that Iraq may 
have purchased a lot of growth media. In 2005, the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction stated that 
the U.S. intelligence community “substantially underestimated 
the scale and maturity of Iraq’s” bioweapons programme 
before the 1991 Gulf War and that the U.S. intelligence 
assessment about the threat of Iraq’s rejuvenated biological 
and chemical weapons programmes, notably its alleged 
mobile bioweapons production trailers, prior to the 2003 Gulf 
War was “simply wrong.”
So, to begin with the odds were stacked against UNSCOM’s 
biological inspectors, which makes what transpired during 
UNSCOM’s first two biological inspections all the more 
noteworthy. When UNSCOM biological inspectors first landed 
in Baghdad on 2 August 1991, the Iraqis switched from 
complete denial of a programme to a hide-in-the-open 
strategy, declaring a programme of military research that was 
applicable for defensive or offensive purposes. Over the next 
few days, the Iraqis said nothing that was consistent with 
biodefense work, but the inspectors saw hallmarks of an 
offensive weapons programme. At Salman Pak, the inspectors 
could see fresh bulldozer tracks from where Iraqis had 
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bulldozed the aerosolization chamber building and the 
incinerator, two locations that would have provided the 
inspectors with incriminating evidence. In fact, the Iraqis left 
the bulldozer sitting right there, making the “sanitization” of the 
site all the more evident. The inspectors tracked down an 
aerosolization chamber large enough to hold primates as test 
subjects, and they found large primate cages. The Iraqis 
blurted out that the head of their biological research 
programme reported to Kamal Hussein, who was known to be 
a central figure in Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs. 
The Iraqis described their research to determine the LD50 of 
pathogens, meaning the amount of agent they would need to 
disperse to kill fifty per cent of the target population. Such 
research does not jibe with a defensive programme, and the 
Iraqis were working with a strain of anthrax, the Vollum strain, 
that the United States had weaponized. Scientists typically 
keep copious records of their work, but Iraq’s bioweaponeers 
gave the inspectors a scant ten research papers. In short, 
although the inspectors found no biological weapons per se, 
they saw and heard plenty that pointed to an offensive 
bioweapons programme.
The same was true of UNSCOM’s second inspection in mid-
September 1991. The Iraqis had no real explanation for why 
the only biosafety level 3 facility in the country, Al Daura Foot 
and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, was operating at a 
fraction of its capacity even though the facility emerged 
unscathed from the war. Later, Iraq would admit that Saddam 
commandeered Al Daura to make warfare agent, and that the 
alterations the Iraqis made to the plant crippled it. Iraq first 
declared Al Hakam as a fermenter repair and storage facility, 
but as the inspectors entered Al Hakam the Iraqis switched 
stories, claiming the plant was making chicken feed, or single 
cell protein. UNSCOM inspectors quickly discovered that:
• Al Hakam’s layout was wholly inconsistent with a 
commercial plant; 
• little economic justification existed for Al Hakam’s 
purported product; 
• seed cultures at the site were inappropriate for a single 
cell protein plant but typical of a facility engaged in 
weapons work; 
• Al Hakam was abnormally clean and did not appear to 
be producing much of anything; 
• the plant’s supposed director did not know basic facts, 
such as the number of people he employed and Al 
Hakam’s production rates; and, 
• the facility had oddly stringent security, not to mention 
dummy bunkers. 
To top it off, trade journals or newspapers contained not a 
word about Al Hakam. A for-profit company would court the 
media to generate publicity to attract customers. In short, in its  
first two inspections, UNSCOM’s biological inspectors 
gathered significant evidence of a covert offensive bioweapons 
programme despite Iraq’s efforts to hide the programme, and 
they identified two purportedly commercial plants, Al Daura 
and Al Hakam, as likely to be involved in Iraq’s bioweapons 
work. 
For approximately two and a half years, UNSCOM focused on 
other disarmament priorities in Iraq and did not conduct any 
dedicated biological inspections. When UNSCOM ramped up 
its biological inspections again in mid-1994, within several 
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months the biological inspectors had collected sufficient 
evidence to cause Iraq’s cover stories to crumble and Iraq to 
admit on July 1, 1995 that it had produced biowarfare agents. 
The only intelligence tips the inspectors had to go on as they 
shredded Iraq’s cover stories were that Iraq apparently 
purchased large quantities of growth media, that Projects 85 
and 324 were somehow linked to a possible bioweapons 
programme, and that the Iraqis had tried to purchase high-
containment ventilation equipment for 
buildings E and H, without any further 
specification as to the location of these 
projects or buildings. 
To unmask the programme, UNSCOM 
inspectors tripped up the Iraqis in 
interviews, gaining key insights into the 
architecture and activity of the Iraqi 
bioweapons programme. UNSCOM 
sampled a sprayer on a second Al 
Hakam production line that the Iraqis 
claimed was making biopesticide. The 
sample contained ultra-small particles 
of Bacillus thuringiensis; particles under ten micros in size 
would be inoperable for a biopesticide but ideal for a 
biowarfare agent. UNSCOM gathered several hundred 
documents from Oxoid, Fluka, Niro Atomizer, Chemap, Olsa, 
Karl Kolb and other suppliers to Iraq’s programme. Analysis of 
these documents allowed the inspectors to reverse engineer 
Iraq’s bioweapons programme, even determining that Al 
Hakam probably became operational in March 1988. 
UNSCOM’s ability to reverse engineer Iraq’s programme was 
also aided when UNSCOM broke the codes on Iraq’s 
procurement documents, enabling them to determine Iraq’s 
plans for various items they purchased. The inspectors located 
22 tons of growth media, but that left 17 tons missing. By that 
time, the inspectors knew Iraq had used the missing growth 
media to make biowarfare agents. As they pressed the Iraqis 
to explain where it went, the Iraqis slipped up and called Al 
Hakam Project 324. The Iraqis also turned over the 
engineering diagrams for Al Hakam, and there, clear as day, 
the research building and animal house were labelled buildings 
E and H. Contrary to popular thinking, UNSCOM inspectors 
earned these and other revelations about Iraq’s bioweapons 
programmes during routine inspections, not during no-notice 
or challenge inspections.
According to Iraqi Ministry of Health statistics, Iraq used barely 
a kilogram of growth media annually for hospital diagnostics, 
so the UNSCOM inspectors knew that Iraq’s assertion that 
hospitals had consumed the 17 tons of missing growth media 
was ludicrously false. The inspectors presented the Iraqis with 
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“UNSCOM’s inspectors did what 
conventional wisdom says is impossible: 
they distinguished legitimate facilities 
from those involved in a weapons 
programme and unearthed a covert 
bioweapons programme.”
an array of incriminating facts to paint them into a corner, 
forcing the mea culpa that Iraq made but destroyed its stocks 
of anthrax and botulinum toxin agent in 1990. Right away, the 
inspectors knew that Iraq was still not fully coming clean about 
its bioweapons programme. After all, logic dictates that no 
state would go to all the trouble to make a super-secret 
weapon, only to demolish it before going to war. Moreover, the 
inspectors already had a handle on Iraq’s biological delivery 
systems, including bombs, missiles and a sophisticated, finely 
crafted spinning dispersal device that a German company sold 
to Iraq. Therefore, in July 1995 UNSCOM Executive Chairman 
Rolf Ekeus briefed the United Nations Security Council that the 
inspectors contended that the Iraqi declaration was still 
incomplete, that Iraq had filled munitions with biowarfare 
agents. Despite Iraq’s extensive efforts to hide its bioweapons 
programme, UNSCOM’s inspectors did what conventional 
wisdom says is impossible, they distinguished legitimate 
facilities from those involved in a weapons programme and 
unearthed a covert bioweapons programme.
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Figure 4: Lessons from the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq.
Session 2 Introduction 
Session two on confidence in the BWC and the Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs) was lead by Chandré Gould and 
Brian Rappert. They set three goals for the session:
1. To explore what ‘confidence’ in the Convention means 
for different people and states
2. To understand how confidence is inhibited
3. To find ways to improve confidence in the future
They opened the session with an exercise. On a sheet of 
paper, all participants were to complete the two sentences: 
‘For me, having confidence in the BWC means…’
‘I would have more confidence in the BWC if…’ 
The responses were collated and reported back on to the 
group at the end of the session. A sample of the responses is 
reproduced in Figures 5 and 6. 
Gould and Rappert proceeded to give a presentation on a 
project that examines the apparent ‘diplomatic erasure’ of the 
South African biological weapons programme. On the basis of 
their analysis they had developed an action map laying out the 
practices, conditions and consequences of rendering the non-
declaration a non-issue (Figure 7). 
Dividing the workshop participants into small groups, Gould 
and Rappert asked if the action map was an accurate 
reflection of the participants’ own experiences in the BWC. 
The second question for discussion in the group focused on 
solutions rather than problems: What can be done to build 
confidence and overcome some of the binds identified?
In the final part of the session, some of the discussions from 
the small groups as well as the earlier exercise were shared. 
Gould and Rappert closed the session with some reflections 
and a strategy for building confidence in the BWC.
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For	  me,	  having	  con/idence	  in	  the	  BWC	  means…
…a strong norm against use and development, transparency, mutual trust between State Parties and between State Parties 
and publics.
...knowing the Convention is widely adhered to (universalization) without significant gaps in coverage (to risks of proliferation) 
has an element of transparency and verifiability (to prevent cheaters) taken seriously by its member states (implemented na-
tionally).
...being assured that no state or entity is violating the treaty, either directly or indirectly. This would include confidence in the 
steps being taken to ensure that there is a clear dividing line between research for 'peaceful' and 'dual use' purposes.
…there should be some mechanism to verify/investigate alleged breaches.
…states genuinely want to reach consensus solutions on the issues, rather than use it as a vehicle for the same tired argu-
ments.
...a credible, verifiable, legally binding multilaterally negotiated provision in order to implement all articles of the Convention in a 
balanced and comprehensive manner.
 
...no state is producing bioweapons or developing offensive programs; states believe the BWC is in their interest; states under-
stand their obligations and ensure national entities abide by the Convention; and states are able to communicate and demon-
strate how to implement the Convention nationally. 
…"cheating" will imply costs.
…that states are taking their obligation under the Convention seriously; that states are not defeating the object and purpose of 
the Convention by undertaking activities that violate its provisions; that its minimum requirements are being carried out such as 
CBM submissions; and that if a state is unable to do so it reaches out for assistance; that states take advantage of the re-
sources available to them under Article X from other states and IOs.
…that there is a substantial level of universality, ideally including "states of concern."
....states comply with prohibitions envisioned by the treaty, and there are effective and non-discriminatory ways of ascertaining 
that.
Figure 5: Select workshop participant responses to ‘‘For me, having confidence in the BWC means…”
Lentzos - King’s College London
Confidence & Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention 20
Lentzos - King’s College London
Confidence & Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention 21
Figure 5: Select workshop participant responses to ‘‘For me, 
having confidence in the BWC means…”
I	  would	  have	  more	  con/idence	  in	  the	  BWC	  if…
… there was a way to understand intent more (as opposed to capacity).
…it wasn’t bogged down in geopolitical divisions (so that member states could actually reach common understandings to pro-
gress the efficacy of the convention).
…there was an efficient and effective verification mechanism.
…there was a provision for challenge inspections (and these were used appropriately).
...it was given greater political focus in the disarmament community.
…there was more transparency and oversight.
…it were strengthened in a legally binding manner, and an implementing agency would be set up for that purpose.
…there was a reduction in bloc behaviour.
…a multi-stakeholder approach (engagement of private/public/civil society sector) would be encouraged to implement ele-
ments of the BWC.
…regional positions continue to become more flexible (as has been the case in recent years) with more cross-regional linkages 
made and nurtured, and thereby putting the interests of the Convention on a higher footing.
…all state parties submitted CBM returns in timely and full manner.
…there is a verification regime, without differences between countries, so there is an equal basis for us all.
…more states parties emulated the few pioneers of compliance assessment or provided their own compliance with all BWC 
obligations.
…the next Review Conference would agree to a larger ISU, a less meager budget, intersessionals no longer restricted by the 
2002 ban on negotiating anything, and more than two weeks in each year devoted to the BWC in the years 2017 – 2020.
…discussion of implementation was seen as a co-operative goal instead of a western objective to be balanced against assis-
tance.
Figure 6: Select workshop participant responses to ‘I would have more confidence in the BWC if…’ 
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Figure 7: Action map of South Africa’s failure to declare an offensive programme and 
how this became an non-issue in the BWC process
Chandré Gould and Brian Rappert
Gould and Rappert reported on a BWC confidence project 
they had been awarded under the Science & Security 
programme of the UK Economic and Social Research Council, 
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, and the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council. 
Their starting point was a curiosity: Confidence is what the 
CBMs are for, but in practice the limitations of the CBMs do 
not seem to affect confidence. Using past programmes as an 
example, they noted that states have made incomplete and 
inaccurate Form F declarations, but that this does not seem to 
matter. Why not?
Using South Africa as a case study of how topics relevant to 
the BWC can become non-issues, Gould and Rappert asked: 
What lessons can be learned about CBM Form F and about 
confidence in general?
They analysed how the South African non-declaration became 
a non-issue for States Parties and developed an action map 
laying out the practices and conditions rendering the non-
declaration a non-issue. They demonstrated how the bypass 
for the South African CBM was maintained, and how the 
bypass is maintained for CBMs in general. They outlined the 
consequences of this for group dynamics: production of those 
in the ‘know’ and those ‘not’; deference to some (experts, 
officials); widespread disempowerment; ‘outing’ delegated to 
civil society organisations; coalition building reinforced and ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ mentality. 
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They also focused on the consequences for 
problem solving and decision making: experience 
of doubt and cynicism about the quality of CBM 
information; expectation and acceptance of 
inaction and slow progress; ritualism in form filling; 
‘do nothing’ attitude; conservatism in agendas; 
reduction of alternative perspectives and 
approaches impairing reasoning; reduced 
confidence in international norm.
Further details of the project are written up in the 
July 2014 Institute for Security Studies Paper 
Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence, the 
prohibition and learning from the past, available at 
www.issafr ica.org.
Towards a strategy for building confidence 
in the BWC
The report notes that the practice of equating CBM 
participation with confidence is arguably commonplace in 
recent BWC deliberations, at least by most States Parties. 
This presumption expresses itself through attention to 
fostering greater participation as an immediate priority. 
Such thinking has been subject to critique in the past.  For 
instance, in a mid-1990s report – Confidence building in the 
arms control process: A transformative view – for the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, James Macintosh argued that discussions at that time 
frequently conflated CBMs with confidence.  
However, Macintosh argued that CBMs were only one 
possible operational measure of confidence and so should not 
be mistaken for it. Focusing on CBMs might help improve the 
political atmosphere for international relations, but the gains 
are likely to be modest and temporary unless the factors that 
foster a lack of confidence are addressed. As part of this, he 
contended that enhancing transparency is not the ultimate 
objective for arms control and disarmament.  More information 
need not lead to better understanding or less suspicion.  
Indeed, it could increase misunderstanding and suspicion. 
Gould and Rappert argued for a four-part strategy for building 
confidence in the BWC:
1. Confidence building beyond CBMs
2. Recognising the need for a process of transformation
3. Recognising the need for interactional transformation
4. Promoting attention to confidence
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“To move forward, the defensive 
reasoning and routines that inhibit 
dialogue and learning must be 
addressed. Fostering confidence 
requires attention to interactional 
dimensions as well as 
process-related ones.”
To move forward, the defensive reasoning and routines that 
inhibit dialogue and learning must be addressed. Fostering 
confidence requires attention to interactional dimensions as 
well as process-related ones. In other words, concerns about 
what is discussed by whom and where needs to be 
complemented with regard for how that discussion takes 
place.
Gould and Rappert concluded by listing a number of 
suggestions to encourage interactional dimensions:
• Promote accessibility of CBMs.
• Consider whether and why the South African (and 
others) case merits attention in the context of the 
Convention and the purpose of CBMs as originally 
expressed in 1986.
• Reduce the tendency to make speculative attributions 
about the reasoning of those that raise evaluations and 
questions, and increase advocating positions in 
combination with inquiry and public reflection by officials 
and non-officials (NGOs) alike;
• Lower the barriers to airing concerns, with particular 
reference to regional groupings. For example, this could 
be done by creating a forum or several fora in which 
issues concerning the content of CBMs can be raised in 
a non-confrontational or accusatory manner which 
would involve experts from all regions. Ideally this would 
allow for reflection on errors and reactions.
• Foster willingness to admit a lack of awareness, 
uncertainty, and unknowns.
• Create a climate in which candour is not penalised or 
seen as a weakness or admission of failure or even 
guilt, though this will take time and need to take into 
account differing cultural and political norms.
• Expand the range of subjects open for discussion at 
BWC meetings and allow space for new issues to 
emerge.
• Increase the number of inclusive, informal consultations 
and discussions outside of the BWC. These should be 
‘safe spaces’ that could be facilitated by inter-
government and/or non-government organizations and 
should allow for substantial discussion even about 
contentious issues. 
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Session 3 Introduction
After a long hiatus, discussions on ways to enhance 
assurance of compliance with the BWC gently 
restarted in the third intersessional cycle. In 2012, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and 
Switzerland launched a process to develop a 
common understanding of what compliance with 
the BWC means and to identify ways States Parties 
can better demonstrate their compliance with, and 
national implementation of, the treaty. Reinforcing 
this process were parallel developments of a compliance 
assessment initiative by Canada, Switzerland and the Czech 
Republic, and a peer review mechanism by France to reinforce 
assurance of compliance. Most recently, the Russian 
Federation launched a process to gauge interest in negotiating 
a legally-binding mechanism (LBM) afresh on the basis of the 
1994 Ad Hoc Group mandate.
Opening and setting the scene of this last session on what a 
LBM would look like today was Nicholas Sims, an International 
Relations scholar and committed supporter of the BWC since 
it was first under negotiation in the late 1960s and who is 
considered a principal authority on the treaty. Vladimir 
Ladanov presented the recent Russian initiative, outlining the 
survey of States Parties conducted in May 2014 and the 
responses received so far. Speaking in their own capacities, 
three long-standing government experts on the BWC – Ben 
Steyn, John Walker and Chris Park – then gave their 
perspectives on what a legally-binding mechanism would look 
like today.
Nicholas Sims
In the first part of his presentation, Nicholas Sims provided a 
short summary of the history of LBM proposals in the BWC 
context. He grouped them into six analytical categories: 
1. Procedures for implementing Articles V and VI to be 
added
2. Mechanisms specific to Article X to be added
3. Verification system to be added
4. CBMs to be made ‘mandatory’
5. Measures for verifying compliance to be agreed, 
but not yet
6. Whole-Convention scope for a strengthening instrument
He noted that the sixth, Whole-Convention approach, 
mandated by the 1994 Special Conference and taken forward 
by the Ad Hoc Group from 1995 to 2001, has the evident 
advantage that it avoids privileging one Article above 
another. It favours wide-scope coverage of the whole 
Convention and a well-balanced outcome to any LBM 
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“The incremental-strengthening 
approach does not distract attention 
from an LBM as a future option – 
early or more distant – and it doesn’t 
rule it out.”
negotiations. But, even so, the history of 1995-2001 shows it 
is difficult to agree on how much attention each part of the 
Convention should receive. Even within one part, Article X, it 
was hard to get the balance right between the so-called 
regulatory and promotional aspects of Article X. Different 
groups of States Parties had different priorities. At the outset in 
1995 the UK and like-minded Western states obtained 50% of 
Ad Hoc Group agenda time for Compliance Measures.  But 
they failed in repeated attempts (1994, 1996), as did South 
Africa, to get Verification upgraded in the mandate.  
Arguments about balance persisted in and after the Ad Hoc 
Group, erupting again and again in the intersessionals and at 
Review Conferences. 
In the second part of his presentation, Sims considered 
whether a LBM is necessary to strengthen the BWC. He 
grouped the various arguments that have been put forward:
1. One group simply says ‘Yes, the Convention as it 
stands is so defective that nothing short of an LBM will 
suffice, to make it work.’ There has been a variety of 
solutions proposed among those who give this answer, 
with varying degrees of urgency. 
2. Another group equally simply says ‘No, if the 
Convention is given wholehearted support that will 
suffice.’ For this group, it is only the conduct of States 
Parties in practice that really matters; in order to make 
the BWC work they just need to comply wholeheartedly 
with their existing obligations, not add new ones.
3. A third group says ‘OK there are imperfections in the 
BWC but it’s still workable, so let’s see how far we can 
get with the existing treaty regime, flowing from the 
Convention as it stands without amendment or 
addition; let’s strengthen it incrementally through 
extended understandings, agreed procedures and 
politically-binding commitments, all accumulated 
through successive Review Conferences and recorded 
in their Final Documents.’
The third, incremental-strengthening approach, has been used 
on: CBMs in 1986 and 1991; intersessional work programmes 
in 2002, 2006 and 2011; the ISU in 2006 and 2011; adding 
vice-chairmen for the intersessionals of 2012-2015; and 
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steadily accumulated understandings as Review Conferences 
examine individual Articles and record consensus on their 
interpretation and their implications, building on foundations 
laid in 1980. 
These CBMs, procedural decisions and extended 
understandings all have the formal status of politically-binding 
commitments, not LBMs. Sims argued this does not matter:  
the incremental-strengthening approach does not distract 
attention from an LBM as a future option – early or more 
distant – and it doesn’t rule it out. Some will see this approach 
as preferable to having any LBM; others as preparing the 
ground for early negotiation, and yet others for eventual 
negotiation, of a desirable LBM. Meanwhile, it takes the BWC 
forward.
Vladimir Ladanov
In May 2014, the Russian Federation surveyed States Parties 
about their views on resuming negotiations on a legally binding 
instrument to strengthen the BWC. The survey asked one 
question:
Are you in favour of strengthening the Convention based on a 
legally binding instrument to be developed and adopted by 
States Parties pursuant to the mandate agreed by consensus 
at the Special Conference in 1994, if not all States Parties to 
the Convention shall become Parties to the Protocol:
1. Yes
2. Yes, but there are conditions (please specify, if possible)
3. No, but this may change depending on circumstances 
(please specify, if possible)
4. No
Ladanov’s presentation provided some background to the 
survey, noting in particular that the 1994 mandate was agreed 
by consensus, contains a lot of flexibility, and does not 
presuppose the outcome of negotiations or the shape of the 
future legally binding instrument. 
In Russia’s view the purpose of the instrument, or Protocol, is 
to generate added value for States Parties by strengthening 
the BWC and improving its implementation. Structurally, the 
Russian vision was of an implementing agency – the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) 
– with a professional Technical Secretariat (TS) to deal with the 
tasks assigned to it, and policy-making organs (Executive 
Council and Conference) to supervise the implementation of 
the Protocol.
The OPBW would be responsible for:
1. Investigations of alleged use of biological and toxin 
weapons 
2. Investigation of suspicious outbreaks of disease 
3. Assistance and protection against biological and toxin 
weapons
4. Promoting international cooperation for peaceful 
purposes
5. Confidence building measures (existing or potentially 
enhanced formats)
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6. National implementation
7. Monitoring science and technology developments
A number of advantages of the proposal were outlined, 
including the provision of a permanent forum for cooperation 
among States Parties; an institutional, non-discriminatory and 
inclusive institutional structure; and the pooling of resources 
for agreed and mutually beneficial purposes without requiring 
universal membership (States Parties may join if and when 
they decide to do so). Disadvantages identified were that 
routine compliance promotion measures (declarations and 
inspections/visits to dual use facilities) and challenge 
inspection procedures (field and facility investigations) 
initiated by one State Party against another are not 
implemented.
At the time of the presentation, Russia had received a total of 
27 responses to its survey. Most of these had been written, 
some were verbal. Many favoured a resumption of Protocol 
negotiations. Only three responded negatively, one outright 
and two saying their view might change depending on 
circumstances.
Ben Steyn
Ben Steyn was part of the original Ad Hoc Group negotiating 
the Protocol in the 1990s. He opened his presentation by 
saying that while he still supports the Protocol, he does not 
believe that on its own it would work in today’s context: Old 
concepts won’t work.
Steyn highlighted two purposes for a LBM. The first is to 
analyse implementation, and he noted that to do this there 
must be some clarity and agreement on what implementation 
entails and implies. He outlined various elements essential to 
analysing implementation: declarations and a means to 
analyse declarations; onsite activities; the increasingly active 
role played by IOs, NGOs, industry, scientific community in the 
BWC environment; and an investigation capacity.
The second purpose for a LBM is to coordinate cooperation 
and assistance. He noted that cooperation has two sides – it 
is about working together, not merely supplying and providing.  
He highlighted the importance of promotional aspects; the 
data base approach where offers are matched with 
requirements; and the role of ‘formatted communication’ as a 
replacement for CBMs. He also noted that public health is 
often neglected, and that a good public health system is the 
best way to ensure biological weapons are not developed.
Structurally, Steyn argued for a small organisation focused on 
‘declaration management’ (which could include inspections), 
cooperation and assistance (like the OPCW), an executive 
mechanism (of rotating, elected members but not a ‘council’), 
an intersessional process with decision-making power, and 
Review Conferences that move away from an Article-by-Article 
review and instead take on a stronger role as the highest 
decision-making body.
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“Old concepts won’t work.”
John Walker
John Walker was also part of the original Ad Hoc Group 
negotiating the Protocol in the 1990s. His presentation 
emphasised the significant technical and political challenges 
faced to move forward with strengthening the BWC. 
He highlighted that during the Ad Hoc Group negotiations, 
States Parties were not willing to entertain the breadth and 
depth of the measures needed for effective verification, and 
that that situation has not changed today. In short: there is a 
mismatch between what’s needed and what can be achieved.
In considering how the Protocol would pass muster today, 
Walker emphasised that it was a negotiated document with 
intertwining and interlinking sensitivities, a give and a take, and 
very reflective of its time. These calculations would be different 
in today’s context. There have also been a number of other 
developments that have significantly changed the equation, in 
particular advances in science and technology.
Walker pointed to the importance of asking ‘transparency and 
confidence building….of what?’ and raised the question of 
how much detail would be required. Additional CBM 
information? Site visits? 
He noted that the areas to be reflected in a LBM would need 
careful consideration. There’s no need to duplicate work 
already done by the World Health Organisation, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation.
Dealing with the threat of bioweapons use requires a host of 
things and is not trivial. It is more challenging than just Article 
X. The Protocol was very much a creature of its time. It was 
originally thought the negotiations would take two years, they 
took six, and still failed. And it is important to remember that it 
was not just the US that had problems with the Protocol. The 
US decision let other countries off the hook. The process of 
getting the elements and balance right in a Protocol shouldn’t 
be under-estimated.
Chris Park
Chris Park echoed many of John Walker’s sentiments, 
reiterating the extent to which the Protocol was a package 
deal and that the difference of views hadn’t gone away. He 
emphasised the lack of common understanding on what the 
goal of a LBM is and what is needed to get there. He also 
highlighted the lack of political will: The BWC is not assigned a 
high enough priority by governments to have the substantive 
debate you need.
Park also raised a number of pertinent questions: How do you 
encourage the political will to read and analyse declarations? 
What do you measure declarations against? How do you deal 
with the shift in threat focus away from states towards non-
state actors?  
Structurally, Park noted that allegations of use are dealt with 
through the UN Secretary General’s mechanism, but that this 
urgently needs to be strengthened. 
He emphasised that response capabilities to bioweapons use 
must be integrated with public health and humanitarian aid, 
and that any suspicions of use must be dealt with in 
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cooperation with the World Health Organisation. He 
suggested the Review Conference can establish a committee 
with a coordinating role for response and preparedness 
capabilities.
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Key Themes
Confidence and compliance with the BWC encompasses a 
wide range of interlinked facets. This workshop focused on 
three key aspects and considered: 
1. To what extent is the BWC verifiable?
2. Do the CBMs build confidence?
3. What would a legally-binding mechanism look like 
today?
The workshop provided a unique forum for cross-Group state 
party representatives, civil society experts, UN agencies and 
other BWC stakeholders to interact in an environment that 
facilitated a fruitful debate on these questions. The debate was 
stimulated through a mix of expert presentations, plenary 
discussion and dialogue in smaller break-out groups.
Verifiability
Unusually for an arms control treaty, the BWC was agreed 
without on-site verification mechanisms to deter or to 
safeguard against treaty violations. Some states maintain that 
the nature of biological weapons is such that they are 
inherently impossible to verify; others argue that while the 
same level of accuracy and reliability as the verification of, for 
example, nuclear arms control treaties is unattainable, it is 
possible to build a satisfactory level of confidence that biology 
is only used for peaceful purposes. 
The set of presentations in the first session provided 
empirically rich detail about biological verification processes 
both in routine on-site inspections and in investigations of 
alleged BWC violations. The resounding response to whether 
the BWC is verifiable was “yes”. It is possible for skilled 
inspectors to distinguish legitimate from cheating facilities 
while not compromising proprietary information; it is also 
possible to uncover a bioweapons programme even in 
situations where elaborate concealment strategies are 
deployed. 
Confidence
Central to the compliance structure of the BWC are the 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) – the means by which 
States Parties disclose information annually. Improving this 
process was one of the key substantive topics of the last 
Review Conference in 2011, and has been an agenda item 
during the past two years of the intersessional process. 
Despite this, many perceive that the measures are not relevant 
for States Parties’ security needs and that, as currently 
constituted, they do not provide useful information. 
Approaching the question of whether CBMs build confidence 
from a new angle, session 2 explored the larger question of 
what ‘confidence’ in the BWC means for different people and 
states. For some, confidence in the BWC means knowing the 
Convention: is widely adhered to (universalization) without 
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significant gaps in coverage (to risks of proliferation), has an 
element of transparency and verifiability (to prevent cheaters), 
and is taken seriously by its member states (implemented 
nationally). Others emphasized that cheating must imply costs, 
and for some confidence in the BWC means a strong norm 
against the use and development of bioweapons, 
transparency of programmes and capacities, and mutual trust 
between States Parties and between States Parties and wider 
civil society.
Some of the practices and conditions that inhibit confidence in 
the CBMs were presented to encourage further thinking about 
confidence in the BWC context. These resonated with many of 
the workshop participants, and included: limited inquiry into 
and public testing of CBMs’ content and purposes; lack of a 
mechanism for testing the veracity or completeness of CBM 
reports; CBMs limited accessibility; perception of low utility; 
and accusations of ‘doing politics’ directed at those who raise 
criticisms. 
The response to the question “Do the CBMs build 
confidence?” that emerged from the workshop was “yes, the 
CBMs do build confidence and they are an important aspect 
of building confidence in the BWC, but CBMs should not be 
equated with confidence.” In short, confidence-building goes 
beyond the CBMs.
A legally-binding mechanism
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals for a 
legally-binding mechanism to strengthen the BWC. These 
have varied greatly; most have been very general, few have 
gone into detail. The most significant was the draft Protocol 
negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group from 1995, but spectacularly 
rejected in 2001, which highlighting the significant technical 
and political challenges of developing a legally-binding 
mechanism.
Differences in approach to a legally-binding mechanism were 
also apparent at the workshop. A number of participants 
argued for a multilaterally negotiated, legally-binding and 
verifiable provision that would implement all articles of the 
Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Some 
were more specific, arguing for an implementing agency – the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) 
– responsible for investigating allegations of bioweapons use 
and suspicious disease outbreaks, assisting and protecting 
against bioweapons, promoting international cooperation, 
confidence building measure, national implementation and 
monitoring developments in science and technology. The 
OPBW would be supported by a professional Technical 
Secretariat and policy-making organs (Executive Council and 
Conference).
Others highlighted the different political, security and technical 
contexts of today arguing that “old concept won’t work.” New 
thinking is required, and two principal purposes for a legally 
binding mechanism were put forward: to analyse 
implementation and to coordinate cooperation and assistance. 
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Structurally, it was argued for a small organisation focused on 
‘declaration management’ (which could include inspections), 
cooperation and assistance, an executive mechanism (of 
rotating, elected members but not a ‘council’), an 
intersessional process with decision-making power, and 
Review Conferences that move away from an Article-by-Article 
review and instead take on a stronger role of the highest 
decision-making body.
Finding a middle ground, some acknowledged that there are 
imperfections in the BWC but that it is still workable. They 
argued not to amend or add to the Convention itself, but 
rather to strengthen it incrementally through extended 
understandings, agreed procedures and politically-binding 
commitments, all accumulated through successive Review 
Conference and recorded in their Final Documents.
Airing these differences in views and entering into dialogue 
about them well in advance of the upcoming Review 
Conference in 2016 was in large part the aim of this 
workshop. The positive feedback received on the workshop 
suggests a significant step was taken in that direction.
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Feedback Received
Feedback from the workshop participants was overwhelmingly 
positive. The expert presentations, breakout discussion 
session, variety of view points and organization were 
repeatedly mentioned in the feedback forms as the best 
aspects of the workshop.
The vast majority of the participants (20 of the 21 who 
completed the questionnaire) said the workshop would have 
an impact on their future work. It was noted that the workshop 
provided “a better understanding of the challenges in the BWC 
environment” and that it helped inform preparations not only 
for the upcoming Meeting of Experts but, more importantly, for 
the 2016 review conference. One participant said, for 
instance, the workshop “helped me develop my thinking on 
how we can ‘move’ the BWC process to a more effective 
space.”
For some, the workshop highlighted the need to think about 
the BWC differently.  They commented: “Need for fresh 
thinking: too much BWC diplomacy is ‘ritualised’.” “Looking at 
the BWC from a more holistic point of view. Looking at old 
matters/issues with fresh eyes.”
For others, the workshop was primarily an opportunity to learn 
more about the context around the BWC: “The discussions on 
the pros/cons of a legally binding mechanism and the 
historical perspectives filled a lot of my own knowledge gaps.”
Summing up the day, one participant said it was “A good 
conversation between government representatives and 
practitioners/academics on ways and means to improve/
strengthen implementation of the BWC.”
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Workshop Programme
09:45 	 Welcome
	 Dr Gustav Lindstrom, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland
Dr Matthew Rowland, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, 
United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations in Geneva
10:00	 Session 1: To what extent is the BWC verifiable?
	 Dr Amy Smithson, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, USA
12:00	 Lunch
13:00	 Session 2: Do the CBMs build confidence?
 Prof Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, United Kingdom
Dr Chandré Gould, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
15:00	 Refreshments
15:20	 Session 3: What would a legally-binding mechanism look like today?
	 Mr Nicholas Sims, London School of Economics, United Kingdom
17:00	 Close of the meeting
The meeting was chaired by Dr Filippa Lentzos, King’s College London.
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